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Abstrat: Condentiality, integrity and authentiation are more relevant issues in Ad ho
networks than in wired xed networks. One way to address these issues is the use of sym-
metri key ryptography, relying on a seret key shared by all members of the network.
But establishing and maintaining suh a key (also alled the session key) is a non-trivial
problem. We show that Group Key Agreement (GKA) protools are suitable for establish-
ing and maintaining suh a session key in these dynami networks. We take an existing
GKA protool, whih is robust to onnetivity losses and disuss all the issues for the good
funtioning of this protool in Ad ho networks. We give implementation details and net-
work parameters, whih signiantly redue the omputational burden of using publi key
ryptography in suh networks.
Key-words: Ad Ho Networks, ryptographi protooles, Die-Hellmann protool
AGDH (Asymetri Group Die Hellman), un protoole
de mise en aord de lé eae pour les réseaux Ad Ho
Résumé : Les problèmes de ondentialité, d'intégrité et d'authentiation sont de plus
en plus prévalents dans les réseaux Ad Ho, mais aussi dans les réseaux xes laires. Une
approhe à es problèmes est d'utiliser la ryptographie symétrique (ou à lé serète), re-
posant sur une lé partagée par tous les membres du réseau. Mais étblir et maintenir une
telle lé, dite de session, est un problème non trivial. Nous montrons que les protooles
de mise en aord de lé de groupe (GKAs : Group Key Agreement protools) sont bien
adaptés pour établir et maintenir de telles lés de session dans les réseaux dynamiques. Nous
onsidérons un protoole déjà établi, qui est robuste aux pertes de onnetivité, et nous envi-
sageons tous les problèmes relatifs au bon fontionnement de e protoole dans les réseaux
Ad Ho. Nous donnons des détails d'implémentation, des paramètres réseaux, e qui permet
de réduire onsidérablement la harge alulatoire liée à l'emploi de la lé publique dans de
tels réseaux.
Mots-lés : Réseaux Ad Ho, protooles ryptographiques, Die-Hellmann protool
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1 Introdution
AMobile Ad ho NETwork (MANET) is a olletion of mobile nodes onneted via a wireless
medium forming an arbitrary topology. Impliit herein is the ability for the network topology
to hange over time as links in the network appear and disappear. To maintain the network
onnetivity, a routing protool must be used. An important seurity issue is that of the
integrity of the network itself. Quite a lot of studies have been already done to resolve
seurity issues in existing routing protools (see [HPJ02℄,[PMdS03℄,[ACJ
+
03b℄,[ACL
+
05℄).
An orthogonal seurity issue is that of maintaining ondentiality and integrity of data
exhanged between nodes in the network. The task of ensuring end-to-end seurity of data
ommuniations in MANETs is equivalent to that of seuring end-to-end seurity in tra-
ditional wired networks. Many studies have been arried out to solve this problem. One
widespread solution is to reate a virtual private network (VPN) in a tunnel between the
two ommuniating nodes. IPSe is a well known seurity arhiteture whih allows suh
VPNs to be built between two ommuniating nodes. However this solution requires a dif-
ferent seret key for eah end-to-end onnetion. Moreover the VPN solution an simply
handle uniast tra. An alternative solution is the use of a shared seret key. There are
many issues with suh an approah. First this key must be distributed among the network
nodes. Seond, to avoid the ompromising of this key it is required to renew the key often.
A solution to these two issues is the use a Group Key Agreement protool, whih relies on
the priniples of the publi key ryptography.
A Group Key Agreement protool (GKA) is a key establishment tehnique in whih a
shared seret is derived by more than two partiipants as a funtion of information publily
ontributed by eah of them. They are espeially well suited to moderate sized groups with
no entral authority to distribute keys. An authentiated group key agreement protool
provides the property of key authentiation (also alled impliit key authentiation), whereby
eah partiipant is assured that no other party besides the partiipants an gain aess to the
omputed key. GKA protools are dierent from group key distribution (or key transport)
protools wherein one partiipant hooses the group key and ommuniates it to all others.
GKA protools help in deriving keys whih are omposed of eah one's ontribution. This
ensures that the resulting key is fresh (for a given session) and is not favorable to one
partiipant in any way. The following seurity goals an be identied for any GKA protool.
1) Key Serey: The key an be omputed only by the partiipants.
2) Key Independene: Knowledge of any set of group keys does not lead to the knowl-
edge of any other group key not in this set (see [BM03℄).
3) Forward Serey: Knowledge of some long term seret does not lead to the knowl-
edge of past group keys.
An important advantage of a group key agreement protool over a simple group key
distribution sheme is the forward serey. This property an be partiularly interesting
in situations where some nodes are likely to be ompromised (e.g. in military senarios).
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In suh senarios, using a GKA, the knowledge of the long term seret of this node does
not ompromise all past session keys. From a funtional point of view, it is desirable to
have proedures to handle the dynamism in the network. These proedures enable eient
merging or partitioning of two groups in the network.
2 Related Work
Key establishment protools for networks an be broadly lassied into three lasses: Key
transport using symmetri ryptography, Key transport using asymmetri ryptography and
Key agreement using asymmetri ryptography. In key transport protools, one partiipant
hooses the group key and seurely transfers it to other partiipants using a priori shared
serets (symmetri or asymmetri). These protools are not suitable for ad ho networks for
two reasons; rstly, they require a single trusted authority to distribute keys and seondly,
ompromise of the a priori seret of any partiipant breahes the seurity of all past group
keys, thus failing to provide forward serey. Thus GKA protools are more relevant sine
they provide this forward serey property.
Most group key agreement protools are derived from the two-party Die-Hellman key
exhange protool. GKA protools, not based on Die-Hellman, are few and inlude the
protools of Pieprzyk and Li [PL00℄, Tzeng and Tzeng [TT00℄ and Boyd and Nieto [BN03℄.
Both protools of Pieprzyk and Li [PL00℄ and Boyd and Nieto [BN03℄ fail to provide forward
serey while the protool of Tzeng and Tzeng [TT00℄ is quite resoure-intensive and prone
to ertain attaks [BN03℄. Forward Serey is a very desirable property for key establish-
ment protools in ad ho networks, as some nodes an be easily ompromised due to low
physial seurity of nodes. Thus it is essential that ompromise of one single node does not
ompromise all past session keys. We summarize and ompare in Table 1 existing GKA
protools based on Die-Hellman protools. We ompare essentially the unauthentiated
versions of the protools, as most ahieve authentiation by using digital signatures in a very
similar manner and thus have similar added osts for ahieving authentiation. We ompare
the eieny of these protools based on the following parameters:
 Number of synhronous rounds: In a single synhronous round, multiple inde-
pendent messages an be sent in the network. The total time required to run a round-
eient GKA protool an be muh less than other GKA protools that have the same
number of total messages but more rounds. This is beause the nodes spend less time
waiting for other messages before sending their own.
 Number of messages: This is the total number of messages (uniast or broadast)
exhanged in the network to derive the group key. For multiple hop ad ho networks,
the distintion between uniast and broadast messages is important as the latter an
be muh more energy onsuming (for the whole network) than the former.
 Number of exponentiations: All Die-Hellman based GKA protools require a
number of modular exponentiations to be performed by eah partiipant. Relative
INRIA
AGDH 5
Expo per Ui Messages Broadasts Rounds
ITW [ITW82℄ m m(m− 1) 0 m− 1
GDH.1 [STW96℄ i+ 1 2(m− 1) 0 2(m− 1)
GDH.2 [STW96, BCP02℄ i+ 1 m− 1 1 m
GDH.3 [STW96℄ 3 2m− 3 2 m+ 1
Perrig [Per99℄ log2m+ 1 m m− 2 log2m
Dutta [DB05℄ log3m m m log3m
Table 1: Comparison of non onstant rounds GKA protools
Expo per Ui Messages Broadasts Rounds Struture FS
Otopus [BW98℄ 4 3m− 4 0 4 Hyperube Yes
BDB [BD94, KY03℄ 3 2m m 2 Ring Yes
BCEP [BCEP03℄ 2† 2m 0 2 None No
Catalano [BC04℄ m+ 1 2m 0 2 None Yes
KLL [KSML04℄ 3 2m 2m 2 Ring Yes
NKYW [NLKW04℄ 2‡ m 1 2 None Yes
STR [SSDW88, KPT04℄ (m− i)∗ m 1 2 Skewed tree Yes
Ours (AGDH) 2∗∗ m 1 2 None Yes
†: m exponentiations for the base station.
‡: m+ 1 exponentiations and m-1 inverse alulations for the parent node.
∗: Up to 2m exponentiations for the sponsor node.
∗∗: m exponentiations for the leader.
Table 2: Comparison of onstant round GKA protools
to all ryptographi operations, a modular operation is the most omputationally
intensive operation and thus gives a good indiation of the omputational ost for
eah node.
Communiation osts still remain the ritial fator for hoosing energy-eient protools
for most ad ho networks. A modular exponentiation (whih is most eiently done using
ellipti urve ryptography) an be performed in a few tens of milliseonds on most palmtops,
whereas message propagation in multi-hop ad ho networks an be easily of the order of few
seonds and has energy impliations for multiple nodes in the network. As an be seen
in Table 1, most existing GKA protools require O(m) rounds of ommuniation for m
partiipants in the protool. Suh protools do not sale well in ad ho networks. Even
tree-based GKA protools with O(logm) rounds an be quite demanding for medium to
large sized ad ho networks. Therefore onstant-round protools are better suited for ad
ho networks.
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Among the onstant round protools (see Table 2), Otopus [BW98℄, BDB [KY03℄ and
KLL [KSML04℄ require speial ordering of the partiipants. This results in messages sent
by some partiipant being dependent on that of others. In suh a ase, failure of a single
node an often halt the protool. Thus suh protools are not robust enough to adapt
well to the dynamism of ad ho networks. The BCEP protool [BCEP03℄ involves a base
station, and fails to provide forward serey if the long-term seret of the base station is
revealed. The Bresson and Catalano protool [BC04℄ is omputationally demanding with
O(m) exponentiations for eah partiipant. Another drawbak is that if any partiipant's
message is lost in rst round, the whole protool is brought to a halt, as the seret sharing
shemes implies allm ontributions are required to ompute the key. Thus only the protools
NKYW and STR (desribed below in details) seem to be usable in MANETs.
NKYW[NLKW04℄: The original paper proposes this protool for ad ho networks om-
posed of devies with unequal omputational powers. In the rst round, eah partiipant
Mi uniasts its ontribution g
ri , i ∈ [1, n − 1] to a xed node Mn, alled the parent node.
The parent node hooses random r and rn and omputes w = g
r
, xn = g
rrn
and xi = (g
ri)r
for eah reeived gri . It broadasts w and {xn ∗ Πj 6=ixj}i. The key is derived from Πixi.
The protool remains a bit expensive omputationally ompared to the protool that will
be desribed in this paper.
STR[SSDW88, KPT04℄: This protool was proposed by Steer et al. in [SSDW88℄ for
stati groups. Perrig et al. proposed proedures to handle group hanges in [KPT04℄.
Although this protool has not been ited as a onstant round protool till now, we explain
here in details why this protool is indeed a onstant round protool. In the rst round,
eah partiipant Mi broadasts its ontribution g
ri
(also known as its blinded key). In the
seond round, a key-tree as shown in Figure 1 where eah leaf node represents a partiipant is
onstruted using partiipant IDs or the value of the ontributions. The node in the bottom-
most, left-most position in the tree is alled the sponsor. The sponsor node broadasts the
set of blinded keys for all the intermediate nodes upto the root node. For the ase shown
in Figure 1, the broadast message is {gr1, gr2 , gr3 , gr4 , gg
r1r2
, gg
r3.g
r1r2
}. The group key is
K= gr4.g
r3.g
r1r2
. Partiipant Mi has to perform m − i exponentiations exept the sponsor
whih has to ompute 2m exponentiations. The protool laks a proof of seurity against
ative adversaries.
Thus both these protools are omputationally more expensive ompared to the protool
that will be desribed in this paper.
The ontributions of this paper are the following:
 an authentiated dynami group key agreement protool is realled [ABIS05℄,
 the mehanisms that must be used in a MANET to implement this group key agree-
ment protool are desribed,
 a preise study of the ryptographi parameters that this group key agreement protool
must use in the ontext of an ad ho network is arried out.
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Figure 1: The STR Protool
Finally the adapted version of the group key agreement protool that we propose, we
all this protool AGDH for Asymetri Group Die Hellman, is among the very few group
key agreement protools suitable for ad ho networks.
The paper is organized as follows:
 Setion 3 realls the group key agreement protool. We desribe the basi funtioning
of the protool only,
 Setion 4 explains how this group key agreement protool an be implemented in an
ad ho network. The main issues disussed in this setion inlude the eletion of a
leader in the ad ho network and the ations that must be undertaken to handle splits
and mergers in the ad ho network,
 Setion 5 disusses the overhead of ryptographi operations.
3 Presentation of AGDH
We reall an existing group key agreement protool in this setion. We rst illustrate the
basi priniple of key exhange, followed by a detailed explanation of how it is employed
to derive Initial Key Agreement, Join/Merge and Delete/Partition proedures to handle
dynamism in ad ho groups.
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3.1 Notation
G: A subgroup (of prime order q with generator g) of some group.
Ui: i
th
partiipant amongst the n partiipants in the urrent session.
Ul: The urrent group leader (l ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
ri: A random number (from [1, q − 1]) generated by partiipant Ui. Also alled the seret
for Ui.
gri : The blinded seret for Ui.
grirl : The blinded response for Ui from Ul.
M: The set of indies of partiipants (from P) in the urrent session.
J : The set of indies of the joining partiipants.
D: The set of indies of the leaving partiipants.
x← y: x is assigned y.
x
r
← S: x is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution S.
Ui −→ Uj : {M}: Ui sends message M to partiipant Uj .
Ui
B
−→M : {M}: Ui broadasts message M to all partiipants indexed byM.
Ni: Random none generated by partiipant Ui.
VPKi{msgi, σi}: Signature veriation algorithm whih returns 1 if σi is a valid signature
on message msgi else 0.
3.2 A Three Round Protool
3.2.1 The formal desription
Please note that in the following rounds eah message is digitally signed by the sender (σ
j
i
is signature on message msg
j
i in Tables 3- 5) and is veried (along with the nones) by
the reeiver before following the protool. Thus we omit to desribe these steps whih are
formally shown in Tables 3- 5.
Protool Steps:
Round 1: The hosen group leader,Ml makes a initial request (INIT) with his identity,
Ul and a random none Nl to the groupM.
Round 2: Eah interested Mi responds to the INIT request, with a IREPLY message
whih ontains his identity Ui, a none Ni and a blinded seret g
ri
to Ml (see Table 3 for
exat message ontents).
Round 3: Ml ollets all the reeived blinded serets, raises eah of them to its seret
(rl) and broadasts them along with the original ontributions to the group, i.e. it sends an
IGROUP message that ontains {Ui, Ni, g
ri, grirl} for all i ∈ M \ {l}.
Key Calulation: Eah Mi heks if its ontribution is inluded orretly and obtains
grl by omputing (grirl)r
−1
i
. The group key is
Key = grl ∗Πi∈M\{l}g
rirl = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri)
.
Note:
INRIA
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Round 1
l
r
←M, Nl
r
← {0, 1}k
Ul
B
−→M : {msg1l = { INIT , Ul, Nl}, σ
1
l }
Round 2
∀i ∈M \ {l}, if(VPKl{msg
1
l , σl} == 1), ri
r
← [1, q − 1], Ni
r
← {0, 1}k,
Ui −→ Ul : {msgi = { IREPLY, Ul, Nl, Ui, Ni, g
ri}, σi}
Round 3
rl
r
← [1, q − 1],
∀i ∈M \ {l}, if(VPKi{msgi, σi} == 1) and Nl is as ontributed
Ul
B
−→M : {msg2l = {IGROUP, Ul, Nl, {Ui, Ni, g
ri , grirl}i∈M\{l}}, σ
2
l }
Key Computation
if(VPKl{msg
2
l , σ
2
l } == 1) and g
ri
and Ni are as ontributed
Key = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri)
Table 3: IKA
1) The original ontributions gri are inluded in the last message as they are required
for key alulation in ase of group modiations (see below), and also, beause it may be
possible that a partiular ontribution has not been reeived by some member.
2) Even though Πi∈M\{l}g
rirl
is publily known, it is inluded in key omputation, to
derive a key omposed of everyone's ontribution. This ensures that the key an not be
pre-determined and is unique to this session.
3) Even though the urrent group leader hooses his ontribution after others, he annot
pre-determine the group key.
The protool is formally dened in Table 3. Table 4 (respetively Table 5) show how the
protool is run when a group wants to join (respetively leave) an existing group
3.2.2 Example runs of the protool
We now see how this protool an be used to derive Initial Key Agreement (IKA), Join/Merge
and Delete/Partition proedures for ad ho networks.
Initial Key Agreement Seure ad ho group formation proedures typially involve peer
disovery and onnetivity heks before a group key is derived. Thus, an INIT request
is issued by a partiipant and all interested peers respond. The responses are olleted
and onnetivity heks are arried out to ensure that all partiipants an listen/broadast
to the group (see for instane [RHH01℄). After the group membership is dened, GKA
proedures are implemented to derive a group key. Suh an approah is quite a drain on
the limited resoures of ad ho network devies. Thus an approah whih integrates the two
separate proedures of group formation and group key agreement is required. The above
RR n° 5915
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Round 1
∀i ∈ J , ri
r
← [1, q − 1], Ni
r
← {0, 1}k,
Ui
B
−→M : {msgi = { JOIN, Ui, Ni, g
ri}, σi}
Round 2
∀i ∈ J , if(VPKi{msgi, σi} == 1) rl
r
← [1, q − 1], l′
r
←M∪J
Ul −→ Ul′ : {msgl = { JREPLY, {Ui, Ni, g
ri}∀i∈M∪J }, σl}
Round 3
if(VPKi{msgl, σl} == 1), l← l
′, rl
r
← [1, q − 1],M←M∪J
Ul
B
−→M : {msg2l = { JGROUP, Ul, Nl, {Ui, Ni, g
ri, grirl}i∈M\{l}}, σ
2
l }
Key Computation
if(VPKl{msg
2
l , σ
2
l } == 1) and g
ri
and Ni are as ontributed
Key = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri)
Table 4: Join/Merge
protool ts well with this approah. Round 1 and Round 2 of the above protool an be
inorporated into the group formation proedures. In this way, blinded serets, gri 's, of all
potential members, Ui's, are olleted before the group omposition is dened. When the
fully onneted ad ho group is dened, a single broadast message (Round 3 in Table 3)
from the group leader, Ul, (using ontributions of only the joining partiipants) helps every
partiipant to ompute the group key. An example is provided below.
Suppose U1 initiates the group disovery and initially 5 partiipants express interest and
send gr2 , gr3 , gr4 , gr5 and gr6 respetively along with their identities and nones. Finally
only 3 join beause of the full-onnetivity onstraint. Suppose the partiipants who nally
join are U2, U4 and U5. Then the group leader, U1, broadasts the following message: {g
r2
,
gr4 , gr5 , (gr2)r1 , (gr4)r1 , (gr5)r1}. On reeiving this message, eah partiipant an derive
gr1 using his respetive seret. Thus the key gr1(1+r2+r4+r5) an be omputed.
Join/Merge Suppose new partiipants, U9 and U10 join the group of U1, U2, U4 and
U5 with their ontributions g
r9
and gr10 respetively. Then the previous group leader (U1)
hanges its seret to r
′
1 and sends g
r
′
1
, gr2 , gr4 , gr5 , gr9 , gr10 to U10 (say the new group leader).
U10 generates a new seret r
′
10 and broadasts the following message to the group: {g
r
′
1
, gr2 ,
gr4 , gr5 , gr9 , gr
′
10
r
′
1
, gr
′
10
r2
, gr
′
10
r4
, gr
′
10
r5
, gr
′
10
r9
}. And the new key is gr
′
10
(1+r
′
1
+r2+r4+r5+r9)
.
Delete/Partition When partiipants leave the group, they send a DEL message, the
group leader hanges his seret ontribution and sends an IKA Round 3 like message to the
group, omitting the leaving partiipants' ontributions. Refer to Table 5 and below for an
example.
INRIA
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Round 1
∀i ∈ D, Ui −→ Ul : {msgi = { DEL, Ui, Ni}, σi}
Round 2
∀i ∈ D, if(VPKi{msgi, σi} == 1), rl
r
← [1, q − 1],M←M\D
Ul
B
−→M : {msgl = { DGROUP, Ul, Nl, {Ui, Ni, g
ri , grirl}i∈M\{l}}, σl}
Key Computation
if(VPKl{msgl, σl} == 1) and g
ri
and Ni are as ontribute d
Key = g
rl(1+
∑
i∈M\{l}
ri)
Table 5: Delete/Partition
Suppose a partiipant, U2, leaves the group of U1, U2, U4, U5, U9 and U10. Then the
leader, U10 hanges its seret to r
′′
10 and broadasts {g
r
′
1
, gr4 , gr5 , gr9 , (gr
′
1)r
′′
10
, (gr4)r
′′
10
,
(gr5)r
′′
10
, (gr9)r
′′
10} to the group. And the new key is gr
′′
10
(1+r
′
1
+r4+r5+r9)
.
4 Using this GKA protool within an ad ho network
In the following we are onsidering a multi-hop ad ho network. We are not assuming any
partiular property of the routing protool whih ensures the onnetivity of the network.
We an use reative protools as AODV or DSR [PBRD03, JMH04℄ where the onnetivity is
reated on demand when a route is needed. We an also use proative protools as OLSR or
TBRPF [ACJ
+
03a, OTL04℄ where synhronous pakets are used to maintain the knowledge
of the topology. We will assume that we have a broadast mehanism to ood messages
within the ad ho network. We are not assuming that this ooding mehanism is reliable,
but we assume that the network is onneted and that ooding messages nally reahes all
the network nodes
1
.
A key point in the GKA protool desribed above is the existene of group leader. Thus
it is neessary to have a robust mehanism to elet suh a leader in an ad ho network. That
is the rst issue that we study.
4.1 Eletion of a group leader
A key requirement is that all members of a group agree on the same group leader. A simple
solution is that the group leader periodially broadasts messages. These messages then
serve as a proof, for nodes that are within reah of the group leader, that a group leader
exists and operates properly. We an simply use the INIT message of GKA protool to
demonstrate the existene and the orret funtioning of the group leader. When the other
1
We mean that synhronous ooded messages will nally reah all the network nodes even if there are
messages loosses
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nodes in the network reeive this INIT message eah replies with an IREPLY message
inluding their ontribution. Using these IREPLY messages, the group leader denes a
group and sends to all members of the group an IGROUP message. The INIT message
an be seen as an IGROUP message when the group is not yet dened. In the following
we will only use the term IGROUP message.
These IGROUP messages are sent periodially; depending on the dynamis of the
group, the group leader will send a new IGROUP message or exatly the same message as
before. If the network only omprises of the group leader, the latter will send periodially
empty IGROUP messages. It will stop sending this message when a node joins its network
by replying to its IGROUP message with an IREPLY message. The mehanism to elet
a group leader simply follows from the property that, in a network with a group leader,
periodi messages are broadasted by the group leader and are, in priniple, reeived by the
group members. If a node does not reeive a message for a xed period T, known a priori
by the network nodes, this node sets a random timer. At the expiration of this timer and
if no IGROUP message has been reeived meanwhile, the node beomes the group leader.
It then sends an empty IGROUP message.
There may be a ollision on IGROUP messages if two nodes or more have seleted
the same value for their random timer. In suh a ase, there may be IGROUP messages
generated by two (or more) group leaders. To selet a group leader, we an use additional
rules. The rst rule is that when a group leader A reeives an IGROUP message from a
group leader B whih has a smaller ID than its own ID, the group leader A just stops to send
its periodi messages. The group members that will reeive periodi messages from more
than one group leader will only onsider the message issued by the group leader with the
smallest index. Thus if an IGROUP message showing a larger ID than a previously reeived
IGROUP message is reeived, then this message is simply disarded and no IREPLY
message is issued. On the ontrary if an IGROUP message showing a smaller ID is reeived
then the node issues a IREPLY message.
Another issue is how the GKA protool takes into aount the dynamism of an ad ho
network. For instane a node may leave the network without being able to send the group
leader a message pointing out its departure from the network. This issue is handled in the
next subsetion
4.2 Handling join and withdrawal of a node
A node whih joins the network will reeive the periodi IGROUP message of the group
leader. He will just have to send a JREPLY message, with its ontribution, to join the
group. The group leader will inorporate this new ontribution in its next IGROUP mes-
sage. Atually there is no need in the protool to dierentiate between JREPLY and
IREPLY. Thus, for simpliity sake, we will only keep the IREPLY message.
In an ad ho network, the only oneivable way for the group leader to be sure that a
node still belongs to a group is to reeive a message from it. Thus to handle the dynamism
of a group, the group leader will use the periodi reeption of the IREPLY messages. The
period with whih an IREPLY message is sent by a member of the group should be the
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same for all the nodes of the group. If the group leader is not reeiving a IREPLY message
for a given number of periods (greater than 1 to handle possible paket loss), the lak of
reeption of these messages should be handled in the same way as the reeption of a DEL
message. In suh a ase the group leader will hange its own ontribution in the IGROUP
message and will re-send the IGROUP message.
When a node deliberately wishes to withdraw from a group it an use the DEL message
to announe this wish to the group leader. Upon the reeption of suh a message the
group leader will hange its own ontribution in the IGROUP message and will re-send the
IGROUP message. The use of the DEL message will speed up the taking into aount of
the node withdrawal.
4.3 Handling merge or split of groups
The merger of groups (two or more) leads group leaders to reeive IGROUP messages from
other group leaders. The sheme used in the group leader eletion an be used to resolve
the onit. When the onit is resolved only one group leader is left in the group. If a
group splits, a part of the group will remain without group leader. The tehnique used in
the group leader eletion an be used in the subgroups without leader to elet a new leader.
4.4 Renewing its ontribution
The group leader and group members will have to renew their ontribution periodially. For
the group leader, the hange of its ontribution or of some member of the group will lead
to a hange in the ontent of the IGROUP message. To simplify we an assume that the
group leader and the group members hange their ontribution at the same rate.
We have given all the priniples of the protool. We preise the details of the whole
protool in the next setion.
4.5 Implementation issues
We will onsider a given period T . To simplify, this period will be used both by the group
leader or by the member of the group as a period to send their GKA messages.
A node an be in one of the following two states : member state or group leader
state. A node in a member state will enter the proess to beome a group leader if it has not
reeived IGROUP message for a duration kT . A node whih has not reeived any message
from a group leader for a duration kT with k ≥ 2 will suppose that there is no group leader
and starts the proedure to beome a leader. Sine a node may not have reeived a paket of
the group leader beause this paket has been lost, k must be seleted so that the probability
that k − 1 suessive transmissions of a GKA message are lost is small. Then, to beome a
group leader, the node selets a random integer ir between 1 and a given number l (bako
window size) and initializes a timer at irtrtd, where trtd is a predened duration omputed
to be at least the round trip delay of a message throughout the ad ho network. With suh
a gure for trtd we an be sure that if two nodes draw dierent integers ir and ir′, the node
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having seleted the larger integer will reeive the IGROUP message of the other node and
then will stop its eletion proess. The bako window size l must be hosen with respet
to the total number of nodes in the network so that the probability that two nodes hoose
the same integer is small. This bak-o proedure is performed to avoid possibly multiple
group leader andidates, for instane, when a group is set up or split into two subgroups.
Figure 2: Transition between the member and the leader state
When the node in the state member sends its rst IGROUP message, it is in the group
leader state, see Figure 2. In the group leader state, a node must ollet IREPLY messages
and form the related IGROUP message. When there is a hange in the group (arrival or
withdrawal) the group leader must hange its ontribution. Additionally, irrespetive of the
modiation of the omposition of the group, the group leader must hange its ontribution
periodially, to maintain the seurity of the session key.
When a group leader is eleted, the latter may hoose to wait additional periods before
sending a IGROUP ontaining the ontributions of the group members. Doing so, the
group leader may avoid unneessary hanges to the session key due to the lak of reeipt of
all ontributions in time.
In the group leader state, a node will also look out for IGROUP messages from another
group leader. If it reeives suh a message from another group leader holding a smaller node
index, the node hanges its state to the member state. In the member state, a node will
have to send IREPLY messages periodially. Like the group leader, a group member must
hange its ontribution periodially with a period P see gure 3. We will assume that P is
a large multiple of T . To simplify the proedure and to avoid unneessary omputations we
an assume that the group leader does not instantly inlude a new ontribution of a group
member in the IGROUP message, instead it will wait for the hange of its own ontribution
INRIA
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Parameter Value Constraint
P : key renew period 20 min
T : period of
IGROUP messages 5s
k: number of messages large enough to be sure that
losses before assuming 3 the message is not simply
a node leaves lost
l: bako window 20 large enough to avoid olli-
sion during the group leader
eletion
trtd: bako slot for more than a round
leader eletion 100 ms trip delay
Table 6: Protool parameters
to take into aount all new ontributions of nodes. This is possible sine the ontribution
of the node member is inluded in the IGROUP message.
Figure 3: Sending IGROUP and IREPLY messages
Both IGROUP and IREPLY messages must be sent periodially for eah interval T .
To redue the probability of ollision of these messages, we add a jitter to times when the
GKA messages shall be sent by the group members and the group leader.
In the table 6, we have given examples of gures for our GKA protool. We an notie
that l and trtd will heavily depend of the number of nodes in the network and of the topology
of the network.
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Group Size of ontributions blindings/seond=reoveries/seond
Modular Field 1024 bits 10
Ellipti urve 160 bits 93
Figure 4: Performane of ellipti urve ryptography, versus a lassial group (modular
integers)on a iPAQ, StrongARM-1110, using the openssl implementation, for a seurity
level of 280. Blinding means omputing gri , and reovering means omputing gr0 from the
blinded response grir0 of the leader .
5 Computational overhead
Figure 4 desribes the ost, on an average small devie (COMPAQ iPAQ), of ellipti urve
ryptography whih is more eient than lassial ryptographi relying on biger groups.
Basially, for a seurity level of 280, suh a devie an perform almost 100 operations per
seond. Thus the lateny of ellipti urve exponentiation is 10 mse per devie, exept for
the leader whose omputational ost grows linearly with the size of the group. Thus there
is onern for this partiular node. Assuming that the leader devotes half its times towards
ryptogaphi operations, managing a group of size 50 will impose a delay of 1 seond before
being able to send the blinded response.
The above omputational load on the group leader is in the ase where the group leader
reeives all the blinded serets at one, and has to give the blinded response also at one.
In pratie, the group leader will reeive the blinded seret at dierent time slots. It is then
possible to perform operations in bath: the group leader an generates its own seret in
advane, and ompute on the y the blinded reponses (gri)r0 upon reeption of eah blinded
seret gri . He an also stepwise ompute the produt (gr1)r0 · · · (grm)r0 , where m is the
index of the last reeived ontribution. When he has to broadat the IGROUP message, all
the omputationaly intense ryptographial operations, neessary to generate the blinded
responses, have already been performed.
6 Conlusion
We have disussed a group key agreement protool for handling ad ho group of small to
moderate size. We have fully speied the implementation details needed for atual use of
the protool, relying on know network tehniques suh as self eletion, periodi broadast,
bak-o tehniques. The protool is robust in the sense that onnetivity losses does not
impair its funtioning. We have experiened that the omputational ost of publi key
ryptography is kept reasonably low. If we onsider onstraints in ad ho networks: no
network struture, high dynamism, restrited bandwidth the presented protool is among
the few GKA protools whih is suitable for ad ho networks.
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